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EDUCATION VOUCHERS AND TUITION TAX
CREDITS: IN SEARCH OF VIABLE PUBLIC
AID TO PRIVATE EDUCATION
Public elementary and secondary schools have become government
monopolies for students from low-income families who have no eco-
nomic alternatives to education. In no community do citizens and vot-
ers exercise any effective control over the choice of teachers, curricula,
methods, or materials used in public schools.' State laws compel chil-
dren to attend school' and require public schools to provide instruction
to all who attend.
Although private education4 represents an alternative, only those
able to afford tuition payments can exercise this option. In this sense,
the students from low-income families, remain captive clientele of the
government monopoly.
The failure of public elementary and secondary schools to accom-
plish their egalitarian purpose presents difficult questions. How can the
quality and efficiency of public education be improved? If competition
from the private sector would stimulate greater efficiency and improve
the quality of public schools, should not private education be an alter-
native available to all children, not just the well-to-do? If so, how can
the poor pay for private education without unconstitutional state aid
destroying the distinction between public and private school?
Two possible answers to these questions lie in the areas of vouchers
and tuition tax credits. These education reform proposals seek to elim-
inate the public school monopoly. Both proposals begin with the prop-
osition that low and middle income families should enjoy the same
choices in educating their children as higher income families enjoy. In
addition, both proposals attempt to correct the apparent injustice ex-
perienced by parents who pay property tax to support the public school
1. The scope of this note is limited to elementary and secondary education, grades K through
12.
2. Egerton & Holt, Can We Save the Schools, PROGRESSIVE, March, 1982, at 28.
3. See, e.g., IND. CODE 20-8.1-3-1 to 20-8.1-3-37. IND. CODE 20-8.1-3-17 states in part:
CompulsoryAttendance: Subject to the specific exceptions under this chapter, each
child shall attend either a public school which the child is entitled to attend under
IND. CODE 20-8.1-6.1 [20-8.1-6.1-1-20-8.1-6.1-11] or some other school which is
taught in the English language and which is open to inspection by the state attendance
officer, local attendance officers, and school officials. A child is bound by the require-
ments of this chapter from the earlier of the date on which he officially enrolls in a
school or he reaches the age of seven [7], until the date on which he reaches the age of
sixteen [16]. ...
4. For the purposes of this note, the term private education is defined to mean all non-publicly
tax supported schools including parochial schools which are defined as private schools main-
tained by religious bodies.
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system and who then pay tuition fees to keep their children enrolled in
a private school.
According to the education voucher system state public authorities
would issue a voucher for each school age child. The family would
then enroll their child in any approved private, public or parochial
school in the competitive market. In exchange for enrollment, parents
submit a voucher which the school redeems with public authorities for
cash.' In economic terms the "voucher plan" represents a "demand
side" pressure, seeking to affect the supply and quality of education.'
According to voucher theorists, the school market would spur educa-
tional innovation so that innumerable combinations of schools could
offer differing educational curricula.7
With tuition tax credits, parents who send their children to a private
elementary or secondary school would qualify for a credit on the I.R.S.
1040 form.' Determining the credit would involve a series of calcula-
tions and some proof of attendance at an eligible educational institu-
tion.9 The primary purpose of the tuition tax proposal is to enhance
the equality of educational opportunity for all Americans at the schools
of their choice. 10
To understand education vouchers and tuition tax credits, one must
understand their background, the various types of proposals, the claims
of proponents and fears of opponents, and the constitutional issues in-
volved. This note will first analyze the regulated education voucher
proposed by Christopher Jencks. Second, this note will analyze the tui-
tion tax credit bill sponsored by Sen. Robert Packwood (R-Or.) and
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), and the bill sponsored by the
Reagan Administration. Third, this note will examine the constitu-
tional issues posed by education vouchers and tuition tax credits in
light of Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist" and Sloan v.
Lemon 12
Finally this note will examine the idea of neutrality in promoting
religious liberty. This note will include an analysis of two controversial
5. Jencks, Giving Parents Money to Payfor Schooling. Education Vouchers, THE NEW REPUB-
LIC, July 4, 1970, at 19.
6. No Magic in Vouchers, NATION, June 29, 1970, at 773.
7. Berube, The Trouble With Vouchers, COMMONWEAL, Jan. 29, 1971, at 414.
8. A tax credit, unlike a tax deduction which reduces the income to be used in the computation
of taxes, reduces the tax due. Moynihan, Government and the Ruin of Private Education,
HARPER'S, Apr. 1978, at 31.
9. Should Tax Credits For Tuition Payments To Colleges and Nonpublic Schools Be Enacted?
Pro and Con, 58 CONG. DIG. 18, January 1979, at 19 [hereinafter cited as CONG. DIG. - Tax
Credits] (From a statement presented before the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S.
House of Representatives on Feb. 21, 1978, during hearings on the subject of tax treatment of
tuition expenses by Sen. Robert Packwood, R-Or.).
10. Id at 16 (From a statement by Sen. William V. Roth, Jr., R-DeL). There are many different
specific proposals for tuition tax credits. This is partly due to the fact that credits can be
targeted to any income level
11. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
12. 413 U.S. 825, reh'g dent, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
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cases: Mueller v. Allen '13 the Minnesota tuition tax credit case before
the Supreme Court during its 1982-83 Term; and Rhode Island Fed of
Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg,'4 which held unconstitutional a statute
virtually identical to the one upheld in Mueller. The purpose of this
note, therefore, is not to argue the merits of private or public education,
but to explain the dynamics of two education reform proposals.
EDUCATION VOUCHERS
Education vouchers date back to the time of Thomas Paine 5 and
Adam Smith.16 Since that era, the G.I. Bill has provided a type of
voucher which permits veterans to select their higher education from
the college and university market place.' 7 Recent interest in the idea of
education vouchers, however, has its roots in the 1950s and 1960s.11
During this period, Milton Friedman promoted the idea of education
vouchers and several southern legislatures applied the idea by giving
parents money to send their children to segregated "white
academies."' 9
In 1970 the Center for the Study of Public Policy in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, under the direction of Christopher Jencks, designed a
"regulated voucher plan" that sought to avoid many of the objections
against earlier voucher schemes.2' This regulated voucher plan became
known as the "Jencks plan."'" The Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO) sought to implement this plan as a five-year pilot project in a
city with a sufficient cross section of public and private schools and
13. 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3220 (1982) (No. 82-195).
14. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
15. For a thorough discussion of Thomas Paine's voucher idea, see West, Thomas Paine'r
Voucher Schemefor Public Education, 33 S. ECON. J. 378 (1967). Briefly, Paine proposed
that state governments pay poor families a small amount to provide for the education of each
child under 14.
16. In 1776, Adam Smith suggested that the master of a public school should receive only part of
his salary from the government. "If he was wholly or even principally paid by it," Smith
said, "he would soon learn to neglect his business." See Janssen, Education Vouchers, AM.
EDUC., Dec. 1970, at 9.
17. Id
18. See generally Taylor, Education Vouchers: Addressing the Establishment Clause Issue, 11
PACIFIC L.J. 1063 (1980).
19. In 1955, Milton Friedman proposed that the state give money to parents to be used in secur-
ing education for their children in whatever schools the parents might choose. See Fried-
man, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1955); Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
(1962); LA Nov , EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES, 8-18 (1972);
Ovalan, Do Vouchers Deserve at Least a Sporting Chance? EDUC. DIG., Mar. 1973, at 20.
20. See generally CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, EDUCA-
TION VOUCHERS: A REPORT ON FINANCING ELEMENTARY EDUCATION BY GRANTS TO PAR-
ENTS. (1970) [hereinafter cited as the JENCKS REPORT], which thoroughly discusses education
vouchers.
21. Taylor, supra note 18, at 1063. The Jencks Plan, which was implemented at Alum Rock, was
conceived in something of a political vacuum. Financed by the Johnson Administration and
published under the Nixon Administration, visions of a grandiose voucher test were frus-
trated by the Nixon Administration's emphasis on a modest voucher experiment. Yet, the
Nixon Administration's long campaign to "sell" this modest voucher plan experiment to any
school district that would accept funds for a trial was fruitless and did not work.
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disadvantaged and middle class students to create a valid experiment.22
The OEO originally planned to select four cities for institution of the
pilot project.23 Due to national opposition to the voucher idea,24 how-
ever, only the Alum Rock School District in San Jose, California
agreed to implement the project from 1972 to 1977.25
In reality, the Alum Rock School District became involved with the
OEO plan primarily because it was a low income school district which
needed the funds that the voucher experiment would generate.26  No
private schools participated in the project,27 thus the major purpose be-
hind the voucher idea, to provide parents with educational alternatives
was not achieved.28 The experiment at Alum Rock created somewhat
of an open admissions system, whereby parents could choose from
among school programs, but not from competing schools. As a result
the OEO was unable to evaluate the effectiveness of a true education
voucher system.29
If choice and diversity are desirable, then schools in Alum Rock
were better places.30 Evaluators of the Alum Rock experiment con-
cluded that parental choice in educational alternatives could be in-
creased without a flurry of vouchers." Such a conclusion prompted
public elementary and secondary schools to develop educational alter-
natives.3 2 When viewed as an exploration of educational alternatives,
the Alum Rock experiment proves a source of suggestive ideas and les-
22. Janssen, Education Vouchers, EDUC. DIG., Mar. 1971, at 7-8 [hereinafter cited as Janssen,
EDuc. DIG.]. Of the 30 cities considered for an experiment, none lived up to expectation.
Those cities which had received endorsements from their local school boards (Seattle, San
Diego, Alum Rock, San Jose) were not the stuff of a national program that seeks to "improve
the education of children, particularly disadvantaged children," and also seeks "to give par-
ents, and particularly disadvantaged parents, more control over the kind of education their
children get.' See Berube, supra note 7, at 416.
23. Solet, Education Vouchers: An Inquiry andAnalysis, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 105 (1972).
24. Taylor, supra note 18, at 1063.
25. The American Federation of Teachers branded the voucher plan as "hucksterism" that
"could turn into a very costly and tragic mistake with far-reaching social implications." The
American Jewish Congress followed suit by terming the plan a "disaster for our country"
fearing a breakdown of church-state separation. The NAACP cautioned against vouchers as
promoting racial separation. See Berube, supra note 7, at 415.
26. OEO funds, $6 to $8 million per year, were to be used only for administration and transpor-
tation costs. See The Voucher Pla NE.A Position, TODAY'S EDUC., Nov. 1970, at 80. Tay-
lor, supra note 18, at 1063. According to Cohen & Farrar, Power to the Parents? - he Story
ofEducation at 81, Alum Rock Superintendent William Jefferds quickly learned that OEO
and the Center for the Study of Public Policy needed him more than he needed them. While
Jefferds wanted a voucher test because he needed the money, the OEO, fresh from several
stunning defeats in other cities, needed a working demonstration to keep the whole voucher
project afloat.
27. While a prospective school, called "Gro-Kids," got a small planning grant in the spring of
1973, and operated an after school program the following fall, in the winter of 1974 no
parent selected Gro-Kids and it promptly vanished. See generally Cohen and Farrar, supra
note 26, at 85. Moreover, private and parochial schools were not included in the experiment
because the California legislature was reluctant to pass the necessary legislation that would
be needed to permit public fund to flow to such schools. See Taylor, supra note 18, at 1063.
28. Id
29. Id
30. Cohen & Farrar, supra note 26, at 96-97.
31. High.Price Supermarket, EcONOMIST, June 1978, at 22.
32. Fantini, External and Internal Education Vouchers, CUR. HIST., Aug. 1972, at 61.
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sons.33 When narrowly assessed, however, the Alum Rock experiment,
in terms of its assumptions about political participation and school, fell
short of its stated objectives.
Lack of a single economic model which receives wide acceptance
complicates the debate for and against education vouchers.34  Educa-
tion voucher proposals range from the free market version supported
by Milton Friedman to the highly regulated "Jencks plan.' 35 Aside
from the degree of regulation in the various voucher plans, all plans
promote increased consumer interests in alternative forms of education
and acknowledge the intrinsic value of individual choice.3 6  All
voucher plans begin with the assumption that the importance of educa-
tion justifies public financial support for elementary and secondary
schools.
All voucher plans further assume that no "best" school exists for all
students. Rather, voucher plans seek to encourage a range of school
types that will most effectively serve the diverse needs of a student
body. Finally, all voucher plans assume that parents should have the
power to choose which of the different "state-approved" schools would
best serve their child's needs. Beyond these points, voucher plans differ
with regard to the precautions needed. A voucher plan must ensure
that all parents, rather than just the affluent, make choices. A voucher
plan must ensure that qualifying elementary and secondary schools
maintain state-required standards.37
Despite the several ways of operating a voucher scheme,38 voucher
advocates acknowledge that voucher systems must contain many built-
in safeguards.39  Legal constraints, particularly with regard to racial
segregation, place limits on the type of voucher plans available to state
school systems.40 Consequently, only a regulated voucher plan which,
33. Cohen & Farrar, supra note 26, at 97, summed up the Alum Rock voucher experience by
stating:
Cooking up the voucher test thus began with one small and dusty California school
district, poor and discontented. To this were added two rather different recipes for
political reform, a dollop of federal dollars, and intermittent doses of outside advice.
With such ingredients and so many contending cooks, it is no surprise that the result
was eventually something of a stew. But if Alum Rock did not test a single clear plan,
its experience does throw some light on how vouchers worked in practice - if not how
they might have worked in principle.
Id at 82.
34. Areen, Educational Vouchers, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 470 (1973).
35. Seven alternative plans are discussed at length in the JENCKS REPORT, supra note 20. They
include: Unregulated or Free Market Model; Unregulated Compensatory or Graduated
Model; Compulsory Private Scholarship Model; Effort Voucher Model; Egalitarian Model;
Achievement Model; and, the Regulated Compensatory Model. These seven economic mod-
els do not exhaust the range of possible voucher arrangements. For example, vouchers might
be confined to public schools (internal vouchers) or limited to private schools (external
vouchers).
36. Fantini, supra note 32, at 61.
37. Areen, supra note 34, at 470.
38. See supra note 35.
39. Janssen, supra note 16, at 11.
40. Areen, supra note 34, at 503.
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ensures integration and avoids church-state problems, 4' would have the
slightest hope of withstanding constitutional scrutiny.
42
The Jencks regulated voucher plan43 creates a locally-controlled
Education Voucher Agency (EVA) as a first step. This agency would
collect local and state education funds, plus an increment from the fed-
eral government to support "compensatory" vouchers for poor chil-
dren,' and, in return, distribute vouchers to parents of school age
children. In the spring, each participating public and private school
would inform the EVA as to its projected capacity for the following
year. The participating school would then be required to accept any
student who applies. If too many students apply, the Jencks plan re-
quires the school to fill half its enrollment by lottery. The EVA would
publicize information about every school before giving each parent a
voucher, equivalent to the average per pupil expenditure in the public
schools.45 Parents would give their voucher to the qualifying school,
which would, in turn, exchange the voucher for cash from the EVA.
Under this plan, any exclusion from a particular school would be by
lottery rather than racial or economic considerations.46
Proponents of education vouchers argue that a regulated voucher
system, similar to the Jencks plan, avoids establishment clause conflicts
and insures racial and economic integration.47 Moreover, they contend
that education vouchers will spark the stagnant public school monop-
oly by injecting competition into the education arena.48 The claim that
vouchers would "destroy the public schools" remains far fetched. A
look at the educational choices made by those who can already afford
whatever schooling they want for their children reveals that many still
prefer public elementary and secondary schools.49 Consequently, edu-
cation vouchers would offer, to low income families, presently unavail-
able educational options50 and offer to higher income families a wider
41. The constitutionality of education vouchers and tuition tax credits is discussed, infra notes
121 to 164 and accompanying text.
42. Janssen, supra note 16, at 11.
43. See JENCKS REPORT, supra note 20.
44. Compensatory vouchers for poor children are necessary for a number of reasons. If the
vouchers represent the property tax that is paid to support public schools, a poor person
would receive no voucher since he would own no taxable real property. Further, the cost of
private schools may exceed the value of a voucher (i.e. the average per year cost of educating
a child in the public schools). Last, compensatory vouchers are necessary to enable poor
families to have a realistic choice other than warehousing their poor children in public
schools. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), which upheld the constitu-
tionality of a public program which, in effect, paid the transportation costs of parochial
school students. Federal funds would also be available to provide additional transportation
required.
45. See JENCKS REPORT, supra note 20. Under the Jencks plan, the EVA would determine
vouchers based upon a sliding scale. In effect, the voucher for the poorest child may be twice
as much as the basic voucher.
46. Janssen, EDuC. DIG., supra note 22, at 7-8.
47. Janssen, supra note 16, at 10.
48. See The Jencks Tuition Voucher Plan, AMERICA, June 20, 1970, at 645.
49. Jencks, supra note 5, at 21.
50. Controversy Over Federal Experimentation With Education Vouchers: Pro and Con, CONG.
DIG., Aug. 1972, at 218 [hereinafter cited as Vouchers, CONG. DIG.].
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range of educational alternatives.
Proponents claim that education vouchers would enable a school to
concentrate its efforts. It would appeal to parents who want their chil-
dren to concentrate upon a specific discipline, such as science, music or
art. Those familiar with the interest-centered high schools in New
York and other large cities admit that desegregation does not present a
problem in these schools.5' Moreover, vouchers are directed to the
problem of overcrowded public education within urban centers. 2 Op-
ponents argue that education vouchers violate the establishment clause
and are, therefore, unconstitutional.5 3 Under the voucher system a
share of public tax money raised for educational purposes represents
direct aid to private schools, the vast majority of which are religious
institutions.54
Opponents further contend that, education voucher plans would
lead to "hucksterism" where private school administrators misrepresent
the capabilities of their school in order to recruit students and accum-
mulate funds. Opponents also argue that education vouchers would
divide and weaken our nation. To make private schools financially ad-
vantageous invites the creation of divisive school experiences for chil-
dren. Theoretically, a group of interested parents could form "Hard
hat," White Citizens Council, Black Panther, John Birch, or Socialist
Workers schools. 6 A division of limited financial personnel and capi-
tal resources between two competing systems of education-one which
is responsible and accountable to the public and the other with over-
whelming responsibility and accountability only to private interests
constitutes unsound public policy. A requirement that each qualifying
school accept all who apply becomes meaningless when the school's
curriculum is so skewed toward a particular point of view that those
who disagree with the orientation will either not apply or will leave
once admitted. 7 Opponents argue that policing of voucher schools
would require a bureaucracy even larger than presently exists in the
public school system. Opponents also contend that education vouchers
will promote economic and racial segregation58 thus resulting in further
"white-flight" from the public schools.
51. Id at 220.
52. Elford, The Voucher Plan Debate, AMERICA, Jan. 29, 1972, at 90. La Nove, supra note 19, at
vii. Last, those who see education vouchers as a clandestine device to get money into the
Catholic Church are incorrect. With public money goes public regulation. While most pas-
tors and principals expect some public regulation (such as fire inspections, minimum curricu-
lum requirements), many regard the idea of public regulation and inspection of their
educational system as anathemas.
53. The constitutionality of education vouchers and tuition tax credits is discussed iMfra notes
119-64, and accompanying text.
54. Over 90% of the enrollment in non-public schools in our country is in denominational or
parochial schools. See Vouchers, CONG. DIG., supra note 50, at 221.
55. Hucksterism, in this context, refers to the promotion of education through showmanship.
56. Vouchers, CONG. DIG., supra note 50, at 219.
57. Id
58. See Janssen, supra note 16, at 10.
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Finally opponents contend that many parents are not capable of
making informed choices about education. 59 Under the voucher sys-
tem, public schools would become the "dumping ground" for disad-
vantaged students whose parents lack the sophistication or knowledge
to use the system.6° Opponents claim that public education, for all its
flaws and shortcomings, is the nearest thing we have to a publicly
owned and operated institution devoted to the general welfare.6'
The prospects of free enterprise being introduced into education via
the regulated voucher plan appear slight.62 Despite their economic ap-
peal, regulated vouchers have not worked in practice.63 In addition,
regulations requiring payment of vouchers directly to the school and
attendance requirements necessary to promote integration, involve con-
stitutional issues.6" Given the statutory and constitutional barriers to
the implementation of a regulated voucher plan, a more viable means
to provide public funds for private education must be explored through
the tuition tax credit plan.
TUITION TAX CREDITS
In the 1950's, Congress realized the need to assist those families
who wanted to enroll their children in private schools. Legislative pro-
posals allowed families a tax deduction from adjusted gross income for
some portion of college expenses and an additional personal exemption
for each student.65 Between 1967 and 1977, six education tax proposals
passed the Senate,66 but failed to gain support in the House of Repre-
sentatives.67 Presently, the Moynihan-Packwood Bill6" and the Reagan
59. See Wilby, The Vagaries of Vouchers, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 7, 1975 at 566.
60. Jencks, supra note 5, at 10.
61. Egerton, supra note 2, at 27.
62. La Nove, supra note 19, at vii.
63. Elford, supra note 52, at 91.
64. See discussion, supra notes 26 to 33 and accompanying text, on the Alum Rock voucher
experience.
Unregulated vouchers, by definition, would allow students to attend any schools without
regard to state attendance requirements, federal desegregation plans, state teacher require-
ments, curriculum requirements, etc. Under such a scheme, one can easily imagine the res-
urrection of white segregated academies. The entanglement issue between state and church
schools is magnified with an unregulated voucher scheme which would place no controls
over how a particular church school would spend its voucher money. Church schools under
an unregulated voucher plan could conceivably spend their education voucher dollars for
purely religious purposes.
65. Seegenerall, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF S.550 TUITION TAX RELIEF
ACT OF 1981, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. June 3 and 4, 1981, [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMM.
Rm.] which concisely describes the present law relating to tax and non-tax benefits for
education.
66. For a catalogue of the various proposals, see PAsTORIUS, TAX RELIEF TO STUDENTS AND
PARENTS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION EXPENSES, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE No. 76-221 CR,
at 21, n. 1 (1976); see also Hunter, The Continuing Debate Over Tuition Tax Credits, 7 HAs-
TINGS CONST. LAW Q. 526 (1980).
67. JOINT COMM. REP., supra, note 65, at 8. Since 1964 every Congress has considered some
form of tuition tax credit legislation.
68. S.550, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981).
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Administration's tuition tax credit proposal69 are attracting the atten-
tion of public funding proponents.
Before examining these two proposals, however, one must under-
stand the present law relating to tax benefits for educational expenses.70
Present law provides no tax credit or deduction for personal educa-
tional expenses.71 In certain cases, taxpayers may claim a personal ex-
emption for a dependent, which they could not claim otherwise,
because the dependent is a student.72 Individuals may exclude from
gross income amounts received as scholarships and fellowships, 73 or
amounts received under qualified educational assistance programs.
74
Additionally, certain types of "job-related" education expenses may be
deducted.75
Private elementary and secondary education obtains financing pri-
marily through private funds.76  Many private schools and their stu-
dents, however, receive some sort of public financial assistance.77 In
this area existing tax laws appear inconsistent. For example a taxpayer
may take a deduction for any contribution to an education institution
but may not presently deduct the amount contributed towards tuition
payments.78 A taxpayer may deduct a business expense aimed at en-
hancing the economic status of his business79 but may not deduct the
expense needed to increase the economic usefulness of his children in
years to come.80 Inconsistencies, such as these, make tax credits a po-
tentially viable means to provide aid to education with the least
amount of federal control possible.
69. S.2673, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982).
70. See generally JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 65, at 4-8.
71. As a general rule, education costs which either qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or busi-
ness, or which constitute the minimum educational requirement for qualification in his job,
are never deductible. [Treas. Regs. §§ 1.162-5(b)(2), (3)].
72. I.R.C. § 151 (1976): Generally, a taxpayer may claim a $1,000 personal exemption deduction
for each dependent who has less than $1,000 gross income for a taxable year. The gross
income limitation, however, does not apply if the dependent is the taxpayer's child and is
under the age of nineteen or is a student.
73. I.R.C. § 117 (1976).
74. I.R.C. § 127 (1976).
75. Under I.R.C. § 162 (1976), education expenses which qualify as trade or business expenses
may be deducted.
76. I.R.C. § 103(a)(2) and (e)(1976).
77. Some provisions that benefit education, in general, and sometimes students, in particular,
include the exclusion from income of gifts, I.R.C. § 102, which may comprise a large portion
of a student's support, and the charitable contribution deduction, I.R.C. § 170, which allows
a deduction for contributions to educational institutions. Other provisions, such as the exclu-
sion of interest on State and municipal bonds, I.R.C. § 103, and the deduction for State and
local taxes, I.R.C. § 164, indirectly assist publicly-supported educational institutions by eas-
ing the financial burden on State and local governments.
78. I.R.C. § 170 (1976) Individual taxpayers are entitled to deduct up to 50% of their adjusted
gross income for contributions to recognized charities. I.R.C. § 170(c).
79. I.R.C. §§ 162, 212 (1976).
80. Lechtreck, Tax ReliefandAid to Nonpublic Education, AMERICA, Oct. 14, 1972, at 285. See
also Winters v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), where parents of students attending a
"tuition free" church school were encouraged to contribute to the school in order to keep the
school operating. Under these circumstances, no deduction was available; payments were
treated as costs of education from which an economic benefit was anticipated.
[Vol. 10:178
Viable Public Aid
At least twenty tuition tax credit bills were introduced during the
first month of the Ninety-Seventh Congress.8' The Reagan Adminis-
tration and congressional proponents of tuition tax legislation consider
S. 550, introduced by Senators Packwood (R-Or.), Moynihan (D-N.Y.),
and others, to be the most effective bill.82 This bill provides for a tax
credit for fifty percent of tuition payments for students in elementary,
secondary, private and public colleges, and vocational schools. For the
first year, the maximum tuition credit refundable or applied to one's
tax bill would be $250 by August 1982. This credit or refund would
rise to $500 by August 1983 and, by August 1984, full credit will be
extended to graduate students and half-time students at colleges and
vocational schools.8 3
According to the Packwood-Moynihan proposal, if the taxpayer has
a tax liability less than the tax credit due, then the federal government
would refund the difference.8 4 Without this supplemental income al-
lowance for nonpublic school tuition to welfare recipients and the
working poor,85 tuition tax-credits would discriminate against lower-
income families.
86
In April 1982, President Reagan 87 proposed tuition tax credit legis-
lation (S. 2673)88 that would allow a family to take an income tax credit
for up to fifty percent of tuition expenses for each student in a private
elementary or secondary school.89 The maximum amount of credit
would be $100 beginning in 1983, $300 beginning in 1984, and $500
after 1985.90 Maximum allowable credit would be reduced as a tax-
payer's adjusted gross income increases over $50,000 per year and
would be phased out entirely for taxpayers with incomes of $75,000 or
81. Wood, Tuition Tax Credits for Non-public Schools? 23 J. CHURCH & ST. 5 (1981).
82. JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 65, at 1. See generally id at 8-17, for a thorough discussion of
prior and current Packwood-Moynihan tuition tax credit proposals. This is essentially the
same legislation introduced by Senators Packwood & Moynihan three years ago in the
Ninety-fifth Congress and again in the Ninety-Sixth Congress.
83. S.550, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981).
84. Wood, supra note 81, at 5.
85. Spiers, Tax Credits for Nonpublic School Parents, AMERICA, May 20, 1972, at 537.
86. Doerr, Federal ParochiaidAgain, HUMANIST, July/Aug. 1979, at 61. A tuition grant for poor
students attending private and parochial elementary and secondary schools, such as a
"Baby" BEOG appears to be necessary. For a further explanation of "Baby" BEOGs, see
Note, Public Funding of Private Education: .4 Public Policy Analysis, 10 J. LEIs. 146, 164-67
(1983).
87. In his 1980 campaign, Mr. Reagan endorsed tuition tax credits in an appeal to fundamental-
ist Protestants and conservative Catholics who heavily patronize parochial schools. His re-
newed interest in the proposal comes at a time when White House polls are showing an
erosion of support for Mr. Reagan among key groups, including ethnic Catholics, who made
up his 1980 electoral coalition. This is especially true with the recent success of liberal
Senate filibusters killing bills that would have allowed prayer in public schools and prohib-
ited most abortions. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1982, at 1 and 9, cols. 3-4.
88. The actual bill was introduced by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert Dole (R-
Kan.) in June. As of the date of this writing, S.2673 is still pending in the Senate Finance
Committee and it is very unlikely it will get through Congress during the present session.
89. Tuition Credits: Reagan Offers Strong Backing of Administration Bill, DAILY EXEC. REP.




more.9' The Reagan proposal (S. 2673) discourages parents from send-
ing their children to racially discriminatory schools by requiring that
the tax credit be granted only to students attending tax-exempt schools
which comply with the Internal Revenue Service's non-discriminatory
regulations.92
In September 1982, the Senate Finance Committee approved a ver-
sion of the Reagan Administration's tuition tax credit proposal.93 The
committee bill, however, reduced the overall loss of federal funds down
to $2.1 billion in fiscal 1984-87. 94 This new version would provide a tax
credit equal to half of private elementary or secondary school tuition,
up to a maximum of $100 per child in 1983, $200 in 1984, and $300 in
succeeding years.95 Under Reagan's original proposal, the credit would
have reached $500 a year per child. The bill would take effect July 31,
1983. Only parents with incomes of up to $50,000, rather than the Ad-
ministration's $75,000, would qualify for credit under the committee
bill. 9 6
While the Reagan bill and the Packwood-Moynihan bill are esti-
mated to cost the government about the same in terms of reduced
budget receipts,97 the Reagan bill does not incorporate any refund
mechanism for those low-income families who pay little or no taxes.98
Consequently, the administration's bill could be viewed as discrimina-
tory against these lower-income families.99 Moreover, even though
both bills will cost about the same, the Reagan proposal is considerably
smaller in scale because it includes only private elementary and secon-
dary schools."°
Proponents of tuition tax credits contend that such a program will
reduce the impact of rising tuition costs at private schools and foster a
91. Id
92. Id at G-2. However, two cases involving the question of whether schools with racially dis-
criminatory policies may qualify for tax-exempt status are pending before the Supreme
Court: Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. N.C.
1977), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (1981) (No. 81-1) and Bob Jones University v. United
States 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1981) cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (1981), (No. 81-3).
93. See Donnelly, Senate Committee Approver Tuition Tax Credit Proposal, CONG. Q. WEEKLY




96. Id The committee tied the effective date of the bill to the resolution of the tax-exemption
issue and accepted a series of White House-backed amendments strengthening protections
against tax credits for parents of students in schools that discriminate on the basis of race.
97. Id The Reagan proposal is estimated to cost the government $100 million in FY1983. This
compares to the Packwood-Moynihan bill which was estimated to cost $99 million in FY
1982, had it been approved.
98. In Senate Finance Committee testimony in favor of S.2673, Treasury Secretary Donald Re-
gan and Education Secretary Terrence Bell both rejected proposals to reduce the income
ceiling for eligibility and to couple the credits with some kind of refund mechanism to low-
income families, including those that pay little or no taxes. Tuition Credits, DER-BNA,
supra note 89, at G-1.
99. See supra note 86.
100. This was mainly due to budgetary constraints. See N.Y. Times, supra note 87.
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healthy kind of competition between private and public schools.10'
Unlike our present federal student aid programs, tax credits would not
stimulate further expansion of the already massive and costly federal
bureaucracy.'0 2 Although the Reagan proposal does not incorporate
any refund mechanism, proponents of tax credits, in general, argue that
when refunds are provided tuition tax credits do not discriminate
against low-income families. 0 3 Current means-tested grant programs
fail to aid the millions of families unable to afford tuition costs who are
also ineligible for need-based government assistance programs.104 The
Bureau of the Census has compiled income distribution statistics show-
ing that 64.2% of children attending private elementary and secondary
schools come from families with incomes of less than $20,000.105
Nothing exists either in the United States Constitution or in our
history to indicate any condemnation of a neutral tuition tax credit
plan which would promote secular and non-secular schools in the pub-
lic and private sectors. Furthermore, proponents argue, elementary
and secondary tuition tax credits do not constitute revolutionary policy.
The Veterans Administration's veterans' educational benefits, which
have had strong support down through the years, provide college bene-
fits, to both public and private schools.' °6
According to proponents, excellence in education necessitates plu-
rality and choice. 0 7 Congress must recognize the financial burden now
borne by those who must pay tuition to obtain the education that best
serves their needs and aspirations. Contrary to what critics believe,
proponents maintain that schools will not increase their tuitions upon
adoption of a tuition tax credit. In fact, competition for students will
continue to restrain schools from increasing their tuitions.'
Opponents of tuition tax credits in general, and especially the Rea-
gan proposal, argue that such a bill would promote racial and eco-
nomic discrimination. Since the Reagan bill does not provide any
refund mechanism to low-income families who pay little or no taxes,
the bill does promote economic discrimination. In effect, the bill would
offer a windfall to those families already able to provide their children
with a private education. 10 9
101. Tuition Credits, DER-BNA, supra note 89, at G-1. Tuition tax credits represent the most
effective and least complicated way to provide students and parents with financial relief from
the sky rocketing costs of education.
102. CoNG. DI.-Tax Credits, supra note 9, at 16. (From a statement presented by Sen. Robert
Packwood before the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives
on February 21, 1978, during hearings on the subject of tax treatment of tuition expenses).
103. Id at 10.
104. Id at 16 (statements by Rep. Bill Frenzel, IR-Minn.)
105. Id at 12 (statements by Sen. Robert Packwood, R-Or.).
106. Id at 14 (statements by Sen. William V. Roth, Jr., R-Del.)
107. Id
108. Id at 16. According to recent studies, college enrollment drops by one to three per cent for
every $100 increase in tuition. If a college does raise its tuition to capture the tuition tax
credit, it will lose enrollment to colleges which do not increase tuition.
109. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1982, at 10, col. 3.
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Opponents also claim that tuition tax credits would promote racial
discrimination by fostering the establishment of substandard segre-
gated academies. The Reagan Administration's announced position in
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States"0 and Bob Jones
University v. United States"'I was that it would recognize tax exemp-
tions for private schools irrespective of racially exclusive policies com-
pounds this fear." 2 Opponents also dwell on the revenue losses that
will result with a tuition tax credit. By the Reagan Administration's
estimate, the tax credit proposals would cost the treasury $50 million in
fiscal 1983, an amount that would rise to $1.3 billion by fiscal 1986."11
In light of present economic policies, it does not appear that the gov-
ernment can afford to lose such an amount in tax revenue. Even
though the recession persists with interest rates unbearably high and
over ten million people unemployed, the Reagan Administration pro-
poses a multibillion-dollar federal revenue loss. 1 14 Tuition tax credits
would promote both the destruction of public education and the verti-
cal and horizontal fragmentation of American education along reli-
gious, ideological, racial, "academic potential," and socioeconomic
class lines." 5 This social impact would erode academic freedom by
increasing the percentage of students in religiously ideologically homo-
geneous institutions. Such a plan would weaken the degree of security
and freedom that teachers and professors have labored so long to
achieve." 16
Opponents further contend that a tuition tax credit amounts to un-
constitutional state aid to parochial schools in violation of the doctrine
of separation of church and state. Providing tuition tax credits for pri-
vate education would entail complex administration, thus leading to
Federal Government control of private institutions. Consequently, tui-
tion tax credits would effectively force all taxpayers to support private
and religious schools." 7 For this reason, in the last fifteen years, voters
have decisively rejected schemes to provide tax aid or support for non-
public schools in every state wide referendum and most national, re-
gional, and Congressional district polls.118
110. 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
111. 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1981).
112. See 51 U.S.L.W. 3192-93 (Sept. 28, 1982).
113. Tuition Credits; DER-BNA, supra note 89, at G-1.
114. CONG. DIG.-Tax Credits, supra note 9, at 25 (statements by Sen. Ernest Hollings, D-S.C., to
the Senate Finance Committee).
115. Doerr, The Packwood-Moynihan Boondoggle, HUMANIST, Jan./Feb. 1978, at 51.
116. Doerr, The Packwood-Moywihan Boondoggle, Part II, HUMANIST, March/Apr. 1978, at 52.
117. Treasury Likes Tuition Tax Credits, But Not Now, 12 TAX NOTES at 1327 (June 8, 1981. Sen.
Gary Hart (D-Colo.) comments that: "If parents use a private school, that's a voluntary
choice. But if they get tax subsidies for it, then it is other taxpayers who have to pay twice."
118. In the only state-wide referendum on vouchers, Michigan voters rejected the plan 3-to-i in
1978. In the only referendum on tuition tax credits, District of Columbia voters defeated the
proposal 9-to-l in 1981. See Doerr, Letter to the Editor, PROGRESSIVE, May 1982 at 7-8,
where he states:
With 16,000 local school districts run by elected local boards, our public schools can
be improved if parents, citizens, and taxpayers really want to improve them. That
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Aside from the constitutional questions it would appear that tuition
tax credits have a greater chance of adoption than education vouchers.
Tuition tax credits require less administration and federal regulation
than do regulated vouchers. Before Congress passes any type of tuition
tax credit, however, the constitutionality of providing indirect aid to
private elementary and secondary schools must be thoroughly
axalyzed.
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC FUNDING
OF PRIVATE EDUCATION
The constitutionality of providing Federal tax benefits or education
vouchers to parents of private elementary and secondary students con-
tinues as a center of controversy. This conflict stems from the fact that
most private schools are sectarian in nature." 9 State and federal courts
have consistently held 2 ° that direct and indirect public payment of tui-
tion to sectarian schools for education violates state and federal consti-
tutions.' 2' Despite these holdings, legislative attempts to provide a tax
benefit to the parents of children who attend private elementary and
secondary schools continue.
22
The first amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.' 2 3 The Supreme Court has formulated a three-part
test to determine whether a statute violates the first Amendment's Es-
tablishment Clause. To pass constitutional muster, a statute which al-
legedly violates the Establishment Clause must: first, have a secular
legislative purpose; second, have a principal or primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. 24
In Committeefor Public Education v. Nyquist, z5 the United States
Supreme Court held that a statute providing tuition reimbursements to
reforms are not made easily simply testifies to the fact that the world is not a simple
place.
119. For example, in Public Funds For Public Schools of New Jersey v. Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228,
1229 (D. N.J. 1978), the district court found that of the 753 non-public schools in New Jersey,
714 are religiously affiliated of which 575 or 80% are Catholic. "It is clear that only a few
...children attend a school that is not religiously affiliated."
120. One notable exception is Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982) which upheld the
constitutionality of a Minnesota statute authorizing a limited income tax deduction to tax-
payers for certain school-related expenses incurred on behalf of dependents. The United
States Supreme Court announced in early October, 1982, that they will review this decision.
121. See e.g. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Public Funds For Public Schools of N.J. v.
Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio
1972); Rhode Island Fed. of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980)
and Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344 (1974). See
also 81 A.L.R. 2d 1311.
122. See cases, supra note 121.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This mandate is made applicable to the states by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
124. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
125. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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parents of children attending elementary or secondary nonpublic
schools, without restrictions on parent's use of reimbursements, violates
thd establishment clause. The New York statute in question 126 author-
ized a narrow class of taxpayers, those with children attending nonpub-
lic elementary and secondary schools, to "deduct" a stipulated amount
from their adjusted gross income. Although the Court observed that
the "deduction" operated more as a hybrid.tax "credit,"' 127 its decision
did not turn on this technical label. The Court specifically reserved a
decision as to the constitutionality of a genuine tax deduction. 2  Ap-
plying the tripartite test, the Court concluded that the New York stat-
ute met the secular purpose test, but held that the statute failed the
primary effect test. The Court stated, in dicta, that prospects for pass-
ing the excessive entanglement test appeared doubtful. 2 9 The Nyquist
decision turned on the narrow class of taxpayers entitled to the deduc-
tion and the characterization of the benefit as a deduction.
In Sloan v. Lemon,' 3° a companion case to Nyquist, the Supreme
Court also invalidated a Pennsylvania tuition reimbursement program.
The state statute at issue in Sloan provided reimbursement to parents
for a portion of the tuition expenses incurred in sending their children
to religious schools. As in Nyquist, the Court held that the statute vio-
lated the establishment clause by proscribing financial support of reli-
gious institutions, and could not be justified under the equal protection
clause. 
13 1
The Nyquist and Sloan decisions effectively invalidate any tuition
tax credit plan or voucher scheme made available only to parents who
send their children to non public schools.13 2 The issue then becomes
whether any public aid to private elementary and secondary education
126. The New York statute under review provided a tuition reimbursement for parents of elemen-
tary and secondary school children who attended non-public schools. If the parent had an
annual taxable income of less than $5,000, the parent could receive a tuition reimbursement
of up to $50 for each elementary school child and up to $100 for each secondary school
student. The statute also provided for tax relief for those who did not qualify for tuition
reimbursement. The law provided that taxpayers who had dependent children attending
non-public elementary and secondary schools could subtract from their gross income a de-
fined amount for each such child, but deductions were allowed for no more than three chil-
dren. It was also provided that as the taxpayer's income increased, the amount permitted to
be subtracted decreased. For example, if adjusted gross income was less than $9,000, the
amount to be subtracted was $1,000; if income was between $15,000 and $16,999, only $400
could be subtracted, and if income were $25,000 or more, no subtraction could take place.
127. 413 U.S. at 789. This conclusion resulted from the fact that the amount of the deduction was
predicated on and graduated according to the taxpayer's income, not actual tuition expenses
incurred. See Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
128. 413 U.S. at 789, 790 n. 49; see also Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1982);
contra Public Funds for Public Schools of NJ. v. Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 n.9 (D.N.J.,
1978).
129. 413 U.S. at 791.
130. 413 U.S. 825, reh. den. 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
131. Id
132. See, generally Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 696 (1979); and Note, Voucher Systems of Public Education After Nyquist and Sloan:
Can a Constitutional System Be Devised?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 895 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Voucher Systems]. See also Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978).
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can pass constitutional muster? 33
The Supreme Court, according to their establishment clause deci-
sions, will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or
governmental interference with religion.134  Nevertheless, a state may
"accommodate" religious interests when it treats religious institutions
in the same manner in which it treats comparable secular institutions,
such as when it provides police and fire protection to churches. The
state also "accommodates" religious interests when it gives preferential
treatment to religious interests in order to promote religious liberty, for
example, when it exempts church schools from property taxes.' 35 Based
upon these apparent inconsistencies, it appears that a neutral tuition
tax credit or voucher plan would meet constitutional muster if it inci-
dentally "accommodated" religious interests by treating parents of pri-
vate school students in the same manner as parents of public school
students.136 Whether or not this hypothesis withstands judicial scrutiny
should be determined by the Supreme Court during its 1982-83 term in
Mueller v. Allen. 37
Mueller v. Allen 138 deals with a Minnesota statute which authorizes
all taxpayers to claim tax deductions 139 for their dependent's tuition,
140
textbooks, and transportation. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
affirming the district court's ruling, held that the statute did not violate
the establishment clause. Rather, the manifest purpose of the statute
was to provide all taxpayers a benefit which would operate to enhance
the quality of education in both public and private schools. The Eighth
Circuit found the statute sufficiently neutral on its face and in its appli-
cation,' 4 ' and concluded that it did not have a primary effect of either
133. Voucher Systems, supra note 132.
134. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
135. Id, Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the majority opinion, asserted that the tax exemptions
were consistent with the state's neutral stand toward religion; see also Voucher Systems, supra
note 132, at 898.
136. The Reagan Administration's proposal is not neutral since it allows tax credits only for fami-
lies with students in private elementary or secondary schools. The Packwood-Moynihan
Bill, however, is neutral since under it parents of any student are eligible for the tax credit.
137. 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-
195).
138. 676 F.2d 1195.
139. The deduction is limited to actual expenses incurred up to a $500 maximum per dependent
in grades K to 6 and a $700 maximum per dependent in grades 7 to 12. Deductible expenses
under subdivision 22 (Minnesota Statute § 290.09, subdivision 22) are restricted to those in-
curred in conjunction with school which, inter alia, enable a Minnesota resident to fulfill
state compulsory attendance laws. Id at 1196.
140. The district court found deductible tuition to include: tuition in the ordinary sense; tuition to
public school students who attend public schools outside their residence school districts; cer-
tain summer school tuition; tuition charged by a school for slow learner private tutoring
services; tuition for instruction provided by an elementary or secondary school to students
who are physically unable to attend classes at such schools; tuition charged by a private tutor
or by a school that is not an elementary or secondary school if the instruction is acceptable
for credit in an elementary or secondary school; Montessori School tuition for grades K
through 12; and tuition for driver education when it is part of the school curriculum. 514 F.
Supp. at 1000, and 676 F.2d at 1196.
141. The statute itself restricted deductible textbook expenses by excluding expenditures for books
for courses not legally and commonly taught in public schools, books whose purpose is to
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advancing or inhibiting religion. 42
As in previous cases, 14 3 the plaintiff introduced statistical evidence
showing that the overwhelming effect of the statute is to aid taxpayers
with dependents in parochial schools. The plaintiff intended to demon-
strate that the primary effect of the statute was to support and advance
religion in violation of the establishment clause.1" The Mueller court,
however, rejected this argument stating that "[D]espite the apparent
absolute prohibition contained in the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses, a strict policy of total separation of church and state has been
neither advocated nor enforced in this nation."'
' 45
Accordingly, the Mueller court found that the statute did satisfy all
three prongs of the Lemon 146 test. First, the statute had a secular pur-
pose because it provided all taxpayers a benefit which enhances the
quality of education in both public and private schools. 47 Second, the
statute was neutral on its face and did not have the primary effect of
either advancing or inhibiting religion. Any benefits flowing to reli-
gious schools by way of the incentive for taxpayers to enroll their de-
pendents to private school remained remote and incidental. Thus, the
primary benefit affected a sufficiently broad class of individual parents
and dependents.148  Third, the Minnesota statute did not foster exces-
sive government entanglement with religion since any benefit to
church-affiliated schools is so remote and incidental that the challenged
deduction does not violate the constitutional wall separating church
and state. 
149
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Rhode Island Fed of Teach-
ers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg,150 held unconstitutional a statute 15 1 virtually
teach or inculcate religious tenets, doctrines or worship, and books or materials for certain
extracurricular activities. 676 F.2d at 1196.
142. Id at 1195.
143. See supra note 121; In Mueller, over 95% of the pupils attending nonpublic schools attended
sectarian schools. See 676 F.2d at 1198; Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (85% of eligible students sectarian); Public Funds for Public Schools v.
Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978) (95% of eligible schools sectarian).
144. 676 F.2d at 1197.
145. Id
146. 403 U.S. 602.
147. 676 F.2d at 1198.
148. Id at 1204, the Court found that the Minnesota deduction available to all citizens should be
viewed much the same as a charitable deduction. See I.R.C. § 170.
149. Id at 1204, 1206. The Mueller court devotes most of its decision to defend the second prong
of the Lemon test (i.e., that the primary effect of the statute neither advances nor inhibits
religion) and does not deal at length with whether or not the statute fosters excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion (third prong). Nevertheless, the court states that it applied
the three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman and holds that the statute does not violate the
establishment clause. Id at 1205.
150. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
151. In May 1979, Rhode Island Governor Garrahy signed an amendment to the Rhode Island
income tax statute allowing as a deduction from gross income amounts paid to others for
tuition, transportation and textbooks in sending dependents to public and private schools in
New England. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-12(c)(2). The deduction was limited to $500 for each
dependent enrolled in kindergarten or grades one through six and $700 for each dependent
enrolled in grades seven through twelve. The term "textbooks" included only secular in-
structional material and equipment. Id at 857.
Viable Public Aid
identical to the Minnesota state law upheld in Mueller.i12 The Norberg
Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the tuition deduction had
the primary effect 5 3 of conferring a tax benefit on parents who send
their children to sectarian schools. The court also held that the provi-
sion allowing the tax deduction for tuition expenses created an uncon-
stitutional bridge between church and state.'54 The court found that
although a deduction was available to taxpayers with dependents at-
tending public and nonpublic schools, ninety-four percent of students
attending nonpublic and tuition-funded public schools attended sectar-
ian schools. 55  Consequently, the overwhelming majority of the par-
ents eligible for the tuition deduction sent their children to sectarian
schools.' 56 The First Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
the Rhode Island statute's deduction for other instructional materials
and equipment in addition to books increased the likelihood of govern-
ment-church entanglements. 57 Considering the virtually identical stat-
utes involved in Mueller and Norberg and the national significance of
tuition tax credits, the Supreme Court must decide in Mueller whether
statutes such as those in Rhode Island and Minnesota can survive con-
stitutional scrutiny.
58
In Mueller v. Allen, the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to
decide the constitutionality of charitable deductions' 59 made available
to all citizens. The Court will inevitably focus on the second prong of
the tripartite Lemon test (i.e. the primary effect on the statute must
neither advance nor inhibit religion). Whether the Minnesota statute
has the primary effect of advancing religion depends upon several fac-
tors. First, the Supreme Court's decision in Nyquist must be distin-
guished.160 The tax benefit in Nyquist was given only to those parents
with children in private schools while in Mueller, the statute afforded
benefits to all parents with school children.1 61 Second, the Court must
152. 676 F.2d at 1200.
153. The second prong of the Lemon test is that the primary effect of the statute must neither
advance nor inhibit religion.
154. 630 F.2d at 855. This is the third prong of the Lemon test--excessive government entangle-
ment with religion is prohibited.
155. 630 F.2d at 859.
156. 630 F.2d at 861.
157. Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Norberg, 479 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (D.R.I. 1979).
The court reasoned that the government would have to supervise the parochial schools them-
selves to ensure that the instructional materials were not used in the course of religious
instruction.
158. 676 F.2d at 1201.
159. 676 F.2d at 1205. This decision will reveal the nature of the "cloak of neutrality" exposed in
NAyquist. There the Court specifically excepted from its ruling any decision as to whether a
"genuine tax deduction" is constitutionally acceptable under the "neutrality" test in Waz v.
Tax Commission.
160. The Norberg court held that it could not be distinguished from Nyquist. 630 F.2d at 861.
161. 676 F.2d at 1203. The New York statute inNyquist can be distinguished from the Minnesota
and Rhode Island statutes on the following basis: (I) the statute in Nyquit operated as a tax
credit, not as a true deduction; and (2) the tax benefits in Nyquist were limited to the class of
parents of private school children, as opposed to the broad class of parents with dependents




determine whether the Minnesota statute's applicability to parents of
public as well as nonpublic school students represents "mere window
dress" 162 to cover up the primary effect of advancing religion or
whether its facial neutrality satisfies the primary effect test.' 63 It ap-
pears that, although the Minnesota statute would benefit parents who
enroll their children in sectarian schools, it remains neutral on its face
and only indirectly benefits religious schools.
The third prong of the Lemon test (i.e. the statute must not foster
excessive government entanglement with religion) may present a signif-
icant barrier to the Minnesota statute's constitutional validity. The is-
sue arises, however, with the state income tax deduction for textbook
expenses rather than tuition expenses. In this context, it appears that a
deduction for secular textbooks for all parents falls within the constitu-
tional protection of Board of Education v. Allen.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's review of Mueller v. Allen gives the Court an
opportunity to provide a standard for the recurring problem posed by
legislative attempts to provide a tax benefit to the parents of children
who attend private elementary and secondary schools. Whether the
Supreme Court will draw a "bright line" of guidance' through the
gray area lying between constitutional tax exemptions in Walz v. Tax
Commission and unconstitutional tax credits found in Nyquist remains
questionable. It appears clear that a majority of the Court favors a
stricter degree of separation of church and state to avoid the evils of
history.'66 Analysis of the Court's acceptance of a "neutrality-accom-
modation" theory regarding religious liberty, however, reveals that the
Court could uphold the charitable deduction operating in Mueller.
162. 409 F. Supp. at 1371.
163. 676 F.2d at 1197, where the Mueller court states:
Although a law may be one respecting the establishment of religion while aiding all
religions equally and without promoting a state religion, see Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), a law that indirectly benefits religion or religious institutions
is not invalid per se on those grounds. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
(1977) (law providing loan of textbooks purchased with state funds and provision of
diagnostic services to nonpublic schools upheld).
164. 392 U.S. 236 (1968), which upheld a law providing for loan of state textbooks to nonpublic
schools.
165. 413 U.S. 756, 760-61 (observation by J. Powell).
166. 630 F.2d at 863 (Judge Campbell's comment in this concurring and dissenting opinion). In
this regard, the Supreme Court's decisions in Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. U.S., No.
81-1; and Bob Jones University v. U.S., No. 81-3, should foretell the Court's decision in
Mueller. Should the Court uphold the IRS's authority to confer tax breaks on racially dis-
criminatory private schools, it would indicate that the Court is focusing on the racial neutral-
ity of statutes and not construing a church-school's indirect benefit from such a statute,
whether I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) or a tuition tax credit proposal, as primarily advancing religion.
See 51 U.S.L.W. 3192-3193 (Sept. 28, 1982) (No. 51-12).
Furthermore, civil rights forces won a significant victory when the Senate Finance Com-
mittee added a key provision to the Reagan Administration's proposal blocking the tax credit
from taking effect until either Congress or the Supreme Court acts to prohibit tax-exempt
status for segregated schools.
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The Court's eventual decision will affect the ultimate success of ef-
forts by the Reagan Administration and supporters of the Packwood-
Moynihan Bill to provide special federal tax credits to help offset the
costs of private education. The courts have consistently struck down
similarly targeted credits in Nyquist,'67 Public Funds for Public Schools
of New Jersey v. Byrne,'68 Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State169
and other cases. The Packwood-Moynihan proposal, on the other
hand, appears capable of passing constitutional muster if the Court up-
holds the Minnesota tuition tax statute in Mueller. Unlike the Reagan
Administration's proposal, the Packwood-Moynihan bill would allow
credits for all parents with children in schools, whether religious, non-
religious, public or private.
For the time being, those who support tax credits analogize them-
selves to the NAACP in 1954 before Brown v. Board of Education
1 70
obliterated the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson. 7
Whether Mueller v. Allen will play the role of Brown, and Nyquist the
role of Plessy will remain unanswered until the Supreme Court per-
forms the final act.
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